Cooper (1986) examined the equilibrium of the retroactive most-favored-customer pricing policy by using a two-period duopoly model. He showed that the most-favoredcustomer policy enables both firms to offer higher prices and to enjoy higher profits. Neilson and Winter (1992) showed that even if one firm in a price-setting duopoly adopts the most-favored-customer policy, the equilibrium does not coincide with the Stackelberg solution. This paper introduces a pricing policy by using a one-period two-stage model and shows that if one firm in a price-setting duopoly adopts this policy, then the equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg solution.
Introduction
In today's markets, many firms compete keenly day and night. If a firm reduces its price, then the demand and profits of its rivals diminish. Therefore, the rivals will counter by reducing their prices. This kind of price-cutting competition is good for consumers, but bad for the firms. Therefore, the firms will try to avoid price-cutting competition. Cooper (1986) has examined the retroactive most-favored-customer policy as a practice facilitating coordination in a two-production-period model of a price-setting duopoly. The most-favored-customer policy is a price-protection contract of a firm toward its customers, wherein the firm guarantees to rebate its first period customers if its second period price is below its first period price. In the two-period most-favored-customer duopoly model based on Cooper (1986) , each firm is to select a strategy that maximizes the undiscounted sum of its profits in the two periods, given the strategy of the other firm. Consequently, by reducing each firm's incentive to reduce its price, the most-favored-customer policy enables both firms to offer higher prices and to enjoy higher profits. Neilson and Winter (1992) have also examined the equilibrium when one firm in a price-setting duopoly adopts the most-favored-customer pricing policy in the twoproduction-period model. They have shown that the unilateral most-favored-customer pricing policy generates an equilibrium price that is higher than the Bertrand price, but that is lower than the Stackelberg leader price.
We introduce a pricing policy in a one-production-period model. This policy is that the firm agrees to make donations to nations or to charities for social services if the firm lowers its price in the future. Therefore, we call this policy a donative most-favorednation policy (MFNP). We examine a one-period two-stage duopoly model in which each firm conducts profit maximization behavior in the period. Then, we show that if one firm in a price-setting duopoly adopts MFNP, the equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg solution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the model of MFNP. Section 3 shows that the equilibrium of the model coincides with the Stackelberg solution. Finally, Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
The Model
In this section, we formulate the one-production-period model of MFNP. There are two firms, denoted 1 and 2. For the remainder of this paper, when i and j are used to refer to firms in an expression, they should be understood to run from 1 and 2 with i j ≠ . The duopolists produce differentiated goods in an effort to serve a single market. Each firm conducts profit maximization behavior in the period. There is no possibility of entry or Therefore, firm 1's profit changes as follows:
On the other hand, since firm 2 does not offer MFNP, its profit function does not change.
If firm 1 does not adopt MFNP, then firm 1's best reply function is given by
If firm 1 adopts MFNP and subscribes the amount 1 1 1 ( ) r p z − , then a usual way to illustrate its best reply function is
Therefore, if firm 1 offers MFNP, then its best response changes as follows:
Firm 1's marginal profit exhibits a discontinuity at the level equal to 1 1 r p = as a result of MFNP. On the other hand, since firm 2 does not offer MFNP, its reaction function is given
Now, we assume that the following conditions are satisfied.
These assumptions are standard in Bertrand models.
3 Assumption 2 states that the firms' reaction curves slope upward in price space, i.e., strategic complements. We assume that the price-setting model has a unique Bertrand equilibrium and that both 2 For details of strategic complements, see Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) .
3 Similar assumptions are used in many papers of Bertrand competition such as Cheng (1985) , Cooper (1986) , Neilson and Winter (1992) , and Aguirre (2000) . See also Friedman (1977, pp. 50-55 
The Stackelberg Solution
In this section, we discuss the equilibrium of the model. Both firms' reaction curves are illustrated in Figure 1 . In this figure, 1 R is firm 1's reaction curve when firm 1 does not adopt MFNP, 2 R is firm 2's reaction curve, and 
Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed the one-period two-stage model of MFNP and have found that if firm 1 unilaterally adopts MFNP, then there exists an equilibrium in which firm 1's equilibrium price coincides with the Stackelberg leader one and firm 1 earns the Stackelberg leader profit. At this time, it is clear that firm 2's equilibrium price coincides with the Stackelberg follower one and firm 2 earns the Stackelberg follower profit.
The model of this paper is the case of strategic complements in which goods are substitutes. Therefore, if firm 1 adopts MFNP, then firm 2's profit also increases. As a result, we can see that MFNP also facilitates tacit collusion like the most-favoredcustomer pricing policy based on Cooper (1986) and others. In this paper, we have examined a one-shot game. We will also study the equilibrium outcomes of various dynamic games with MFNP in the future.
